The ONRR has proposed to reform federal coal valuation policy for royalty assessment and in this paper we estimate the expected changes associated with different reform options. We find that if royalty revenues are determined using the delivered price of coal instead of prices used in non-arm's length transactions, royalty revenues from domestic sales to power generators would increase by $141 million per year. The associated price effect is an increase of 23 cents per ton (0.89%) and the effect on the quantity is a decrease of 971 thousand tons per year (-0.17%). In addition to using delivered prices for royalty valuation if transportation costs that exceed 50% of the net delivered price are included in royalty payments, royalty revenues from domestic sales to power generators are expected to increase by $517 million per year. This change would increase the average price of coal by 88 cents per ton (3.36%), decrease the quantity extracted by 3.7 million tons per year (-0.65%), and reduce severance and income tax collections by $13 million per year.
Introduction
Royalty revenues and bonus payments for all minerals extracted from public lands and waters represents the largest non-tax source of income for the US government. In 2014, the US government received $704 million in royalty payments from federal coal leases. The federal government owns roughly one-third of coal reserves in the US, and coal production from federal leases is approximately 43 percent of total domestic coal production (Humphries & Sherlock, 2013) . The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) administer the federal coal leasing program and have multiple and diverse objectives: a fair return for US taxpayers, economic development and jobs, energy costs and security, and environmental protection.
The ONRR has proposed to reform the way federal coal is valued for the purpose of assessing federal royalties. 1 Currently, royalties are assessed on the proceeds of coal from the first transaction.
If this first sale is between affiliated parties, i.e., not at arm's length, the lessee follows a series of five benchmarks defined by the ONRR to estimate the market value of the coal. These benchmarks are difficult to follow, are not transparent to the public, and may lower the price of coal below market prices, reducing the royalty value to the federal government (GAO, 2013) . A main concern occurs when a mine sells coal to an affiliated logistics/marketing company who then sells the coal to an end consumer, e.g. a power plant, at a higher price. The concern in this case is that the price used for royalty valuation is based on the lower price from the first affiliated sale rather than the higher price paid by the end consumer net transportation costs. The proposed reform would eliminate the benchmarks and use the first arm's length sale of coal, i.e. the delivered price net transportation costs, for royalty valuation in all instances.
The ONRR projects that this change will have little to no impact on federal royalty collections, but casual market observations indicate otherwise. In many cases, there are differences between the free on board (fob) prices at the mines and the delivered prices to power plants that are not entirely explained by transportation costs. The average price reported to ONRR for royalty payments in Montana and Wyoming is $15.30 and $12.74 per ton respectively (see Table 1 ). Using coal deliveries, we find that the average prices for coal (net transportation costs) extracted in Montana and Wyoming are $22.03 and $15.40 respectively (see Table 3 ). If delivered prices are 20% greater than the prices used for royalty valuation, as suggested by these data, then one might expect a significant change in federal royalty collections when delivered prices are used for royalty valuations. 2 This paper evaluates two options for how the regulation could be finalized responding to two questions posed by the ONRR. The proposed reform asks what alternative methods might be used to value coal sold in non-arms length sales, and whether transportation cost deductions should be limited. The two options we assess are whether the ONRR should value coal based on delivered prices net of transportation costs, and whether transportation costs deductions should be limited to 50 percent of the value of coal.
The reforms we consider are expected to increase royalty revenue and the cost of delivering coal to the domestic power sector. Increases in the average price of coal and decreases in the quantity of coal extracted are expected as well. To estimate the expected magnitudes of these changes, we construct a partial equilibrium model with relevant policy variables. The equilibrium condition of our model is implicitly differentiated with respect to the relevant policy variables to determine the comparative statics of the model. Our analysis focuses just on coal extracted for use in the domestic electric power sector (91% of the market) at the state-year level for states with federal leases over the fiscal years [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] . We use data on quantities, prices, transportation costs and elasticities of supply and demand to estimate the how the reforms we consider affect prices, quantities, and royalty revenues. Additionally, an increase in royalty revenues is expected to lead to a decrease in state severance tax and income tax collections. 3 Our model captures these tax interactions and we estimate the associated changes in severance and income taxes.
We find that when royalty valuations are based on delivered prices of coal, average total royalty revenues increase by $141 million per year. The 90% confidence interval associated with the change in royalty revenues is an annual increase in revenue between $106 million per year and $176 million per year. We find that the average increase in price is 23 cents per ton (0.89%) and the decrease in the quantity of coal extracted is 971 thousand tons per year (-0.17%). Severance and income tax collections are expected to decrease by $4 million per year, easily offset by the increase in royalty revenues.
When the value of coal is based on delivered prices net of transportation costs, and when transportation costs deductions are limited to 50 percent of the value of coal, we find that royalty revenues are expected to increase by $517 million per year. This change would increase the average price of coal by 88 cents per ton (3.36%), decrease the quantity extracted by 3.7 million tons per year (-0.65%), and reduce severance and income tax collections by $13 million per year. We find evidence of heterogenous impacts across states, with a much larger impact for the Powder River Basin (PRB) states of Wyoming and Montana where more coal is extracted from federal leases and transportation costs are greater.
Previous research on federal royalties/state severance taxes from coal by Kolstad and Wolak (1983) , Alt, Baumann, and Zimmerman (1983) , and Kolstad and Wolak (1985) consider competition across states when setting severance taxes and the optimal severance tax rates. The policy changes considered in this paper do not involve across state competition as federal royalty rates apply uniformly across states. 4 There is also a large literature focused on policy changes in markets for non-renewable resources. A majority of these studies consider how policies interact with the temporal dynamics of the model and focus on optimal extraction paths over time. Optimal taxation with non-renewable resources is considered by Gamponia and Mendelsohn (1985) , Ranck (1985) , Yücel (1986) , Yücel (1988) , Yücel (1989) , and Rowse (1997) . These studies differ with respect to the types of taxes considered and the given market structure. The overarching finding is that royalty/severances taxes are effective methods to generate revenue with limited tax burdens. 5
One main difference between previous studies and the current analysis is that our focus is on static changes in prices, quantities, and revenue collections rather than dynamic extraction paths. This focus motivates the use of a partial equilibrium model and an advantage of the current approach is the relative simplicity of the partial equilibrium model. It is also important to note that our analysis is retrospective and it is unclear how our model, or any related model, might preform with future, out of sample, predictions. While our analysis reflects on changes in previous years, it 4 In Section 4.5 we discuss why coal from different states/basins are imperfect substitutes and why the policy changes we consider are unlikely to cause substitution across states.
5 More recent studies such as Deacon (1993) , Kunce (2003) , Kunce, Gerking, and Morgan (2004) , Kunce, Gerking, Morgan, and Maddux (2003) , and Chakravorty, Gerking, and Leach (2010) focus on the dynamics of the oil and gas industry. Many of these studies assume that prices are exogenous and focus on the dynamic implications of changes in policy. Of particular relevance for the oil and gas industry is how changes in policy affect exploration over time, but changes in exploration are not as relevant for the coal industry.
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highlights the importance of reforming the assessment of federal coal royalties for the future.
Model
The foundation of the analysis is based on a partial equilibrium model with general forms of demand and supply. Federal tax policies and other features specific to coal markets are introduced on the demand and supply side. The model is used to determine how a change in the price of coal used for royalty valuation and changes in the deductibility of transportation costs affect equilibrium outcomes of coal markets. A change in the valuation of coal is modeled as an increase in the federal royalty rate from a lower effective rate based on delivered prices to a potentially higher statutory rate based on reported prices. 6 Two different changes in transportation cost deductions are considered: one where firms may deduct transportation costs that are a fraction of the price, and another change where firms may only deduct a share of the transportation costs (independent of the price). The equilibrium outcomes of interest are the changes in the prices and quantities of coal as well as changes in federal royalty payments. Additionally, we consider changes in state severance taxes and corporate income tax revenue based on the interactions between royalty payments and the tax base for these federal, state, and local production and income taxes.
The quantity demanded of coal is specified as a function of the price paid by a utility/generation facility where Q = D(p + T ). Q is the total volume of coal delivered, the net price of coal is p, and T is the transportation cost per unit of coal delivered to the utility/generation facility. In the US, utilities typically pay for the cost of transporting coal from the mine to their generation facility making the gross price for a unit of coal p + T . The market supply of coal is Q = S(p s ) where p s is the price per unit of coal retained by the mine/seller in an arm's length transaction. The net price, p differs from p s due to royalty and tax payments. In the absence of these payments p = p s .
Let τ r be the federal royalty rate, and assume that the per unit royalties are levied on the gross price of coal. The ONRR currently allows transportation costs to be deducted from royalty payments. In this paper, we consider two changes in this policy. The first policy determines the transportation cost deduction as a proportion of the price. Let β ∈ [0, ∞) be this proportion of the price and letT = max{T − βp, 0}. On a per-unit basis, a mine receives p and must pay τ r p + τ rT in royalties. In our analysis below, we abuse notation by using ∂T ∂p and ∂T ∂β terms. These partial derivatives are defined piecewise where
The other policy we consider determines the transportation cost deduction as a share of the transportation costs. Let γ ∈ [0, 1] be this share where on a per-unit basis, a mine receives p and must pay τ r p + τ r γT in royalties. Combining both types of transportation cost policies, the mine must pay τ r p + τ r (γT +T ) as a per-unit royalty payment. The current ONRR policy has β becoming infinite and γ = 0 so that royalties are levied just on the net price of coal. When β = 0 or when γ = 1, no portion of the transportation costs are deductible from royalty payments. In the analysis of our model, we compare marginal changes in β to marginal changes in γ.
In addition to royalties, mines pay state severance taxes on the value of coal (including local government production taxes on the value of coal) and corporate income taxes on profits. Some states use ad-valorem severance taxes, but others use a per-unit tax or both. Let τ s be the advalorem state severance tax rate and τ s is the per-unit rate. Ad-valorem state severance taxes are levied on the remaining revenue after royalty payments and average severance taxes from mines on federal land are τ s (1 − τ r )p − τ r (γT +T ) + τ s . If a state only uses an ad-valorem severance tax, then τ s = 0, and when τ s = 0 only the per-unit tax is used. Income taxes are embodied by τ c , where τ c is a proxy for the federal and state corporate income tax rate. 7 Corporate income taxes depend on costs and revenue. With regards to costs, it is assumed that all mines experience constant returns to scale given their current production levels. Overall production may exhibit different scale relationships, but in the range of production levels considered, the average cost is a constant c. Corporate income taxes are levied on profits after severance taxes and royalties, and average corporate income taxes from mines on federal land are τ c (1−τ s ) (1−τ r )p−τ r (γT +T ) −τ c τ s −τ c c.
Combining corporate income taxes, severance taxes and royalties, the average price a mine on 7 It is possible to have separate federal and state corporate income tax rates, but they are combined here for simplicity. If τ cf is the federal corporate tax rate and τcs is the rate for the state, the combined rate is τc = τ cf + τcs − τ cf τcs.
6 federal land receives for coal is
One final institutional detail incorporated into the analysis is that federal royalties are only levied on coal extracted from federal land. Let α ∈ [0, 1] be the share of production from federal leases where a share of 1 − α of total production has a royalty rate of τ r = 0. The equilibrium condition of the model is
and this condition implicitly defines the equilibrium price p * as a function of the tax rates and other parameters including β, γ, T and c. The equilibrium quantity is determined by either the demand or supply function where using the demand function Q * = D(p * + T ). Total royalty collections (RTR) are
The severance tax revenue (STR) is
Total corporate income tax revenue (CITR) is as follows.
2.1 A Change in the Royalty Rate
Implicitly differentiation equation (1) to consider how a marginal change in the royalty rate affects the equilibrium price.
Result 2.1. A marginal change in τ r results in the following change in the equilibrium price:
where is the price elasticity of demand and η is the price elasticity of supply.
It is expected that ∂p * ∂τr ≥ 0 so that an increase in the royalty rate results in an increase in the price for coal. With tax rates between 0 and 1, ≤ 0, and η ≥ 0, it must be that ∂p * ∂τr ≥ 0. The increase in the price will be greatest when demand is perfectly inelastic ( = 0) or when supply is perfectly elastic (η becomes infinite), and the largest increase in price expected is α p * +γT +T / 1−ατ r 1+
Alternatively, the increase in price will be the smallest when demand is perfectly elastic ( becomes infinitely negative) or when supply is perfectly inelastic (η = 0), and in these cases, the price does not change with a marginal increase in the royalty rate. Combining the extreme cases for the price change, the price change is bounded as follows.
Using the demand or supply function, the change in the quantity resulting from a marginal change in the royalty rate is
where the top term comes from the demand function and the bottom from supply. For both terms, ∂Q * ∂τr ≤ 0. With perfectly inelastic supply or perfectly inelastic demand, ∂Q * ∂τr = 0. The quantity changes the most when either supply is perfectly elastic or when demand is perfectly elastic. With 8 As η becomes infinite, the limit is evaluated using L'Hôpital's Rule. 8 perfectly elastic supply, the change in quantity is
where η = ∞ implies that η becomes infinite. The change in quantity with perfectly elastic demand is
Note that when demand and supply are perfectly elastic, a marginal change in τ r does not change the price, but results in an infinite decrease in the quantity. Since this case is not realistic, the change in the quantity is bounded as follows.
Lemma 2.3. Assume that ∈ (−∞, 0], η ∈ [0, ∞), and that does not become infinitely negative when η becomes infinite, then
Not allowing for to become infinitely negative when η becomes infinite rules out the case of perfectly elastic supply and demand.
Besides changes in the equilibrium price and quantity, a marginal change in the royalty rate affects royalty collections, severance tax collections, and income tax collections. Royalty revenue is defined in equation (2) 
The signs of these comparative statics are ambiguous resulting in an uncertain change in severance taxes and corporate income taxes. The inability to sign both 
With tax rates between 0 and 1, ≤ 0, and η ≥ 0, it must be that ∂p * ∂β ≤ 0. Currently, transportation costs are fully deductible from federal royalty payments, so β is infinite. A marginal decrease in β, ∂β < 0, results in a marginal increase in the price, ∂p * > 0, as more transportation costs are included in the value against which federal royalty liability is assessed.
The possible values of the price elasticity of demand and supply bound the possible values of ∂p * ∂β . When demand is perfectly elastic or when supply is perfectly inelastic, then
Alternatively when demand is perfectly inelastic or when supply is perfectly elastic, then
. Combining these two cases bounds the change in the price as follows.
The demand and supply functions are used to determine how a marginal decrease in β affects the equilibrium quantity. These changes are
where the first equation is from the demand and the second equation is from the supply function.
We expect ∂Q * ∂β ≥ 0, so that a decrease in β, ∂β < 0, results in a decrease in the quantity, ∂Q * < 0. With a perfectly inelastic demand or supply, a marginal change in β does not change the quantity.
If demand is perfectly elastic the change in quantity is
and when supply is perfectly elastic the change in quantity is
As before, the change in quantity can be bounded and the bounds are as follows.
Lemma 2.6. Assume that ∈ (−∞, 0], η ∈ [0, ∞), and that does not become infinitely negative when η becomes infinite, then
A change in β also results in a change in royalty and tax collections. The change in royalty
This change cannot be signed, but the first term is positive and the second term is negative. Overall, if ∂RTR ∂β < 0, then a decrease in the deductibility of transportation costs results in an increase in royalty collections. The change in severance tax is
and the change in corporate income tax is
A Change in γ
Finally, consider a marginal increase in γ where this change affects the price as follows.
Result 2.7. A marginal change in γ results in the following change in the equilibrium price:
Under the usual assumptions regarding tax rates, and η,
Examining the limiting values of and η allows us to place bounds on this price change.
The changes in quantity due to a marginal increase in γ are
where the top change is determined from the demand function and the bottom change is from supply. A marginal increase in γ, results in a decrease in the quantity, ∂Q * ∂γ ≤ 0, and the decrease in the quantity is bounded by the minimum of
. When demand is perfectly elastic the change in quantity is
In addition to the changes in price and quantity, royalty and tax collections experience the following changes due to a marginal increase in γ.
Comparing changes in γ to changes in β, a marginal increase in γ is similar to a marginal decrease in β. Both of these changes increase the royalty payments associated with transportation costs. Examining the different price, quantity and revenue terms, note that marginal changes in γ include T terms where marginal changes in β include ∂T ∂β terms. From above, ∂T ∂β is either −p * or 0 depending on the relationship between T , β, and p * .
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There are at least two main differences between marginal changes in γ compared to marginal changes in β. First, changes in β contain threshold effects where a marginal change in β may have no effect depending on the value of ∂T ∂β . Thus a decrease in β may affect some markets, but not others. A marginal change in γ does not contain threshold effects, so a marginal increase in γ affects all markets. The second main difference is that the effect of a marginal change in γ is based on the value of T while the effect of a marginal change in β is based on the value of p * . This is because γ is reflective of the share of transportation costs that are deductible and β is reflective of the amount of transportation costs that are deductible as a proportion of the price.
Data
Demand in the US coal market is primarily driven by electricity generation, as this sector accounts for 93% of all coal used in the US between -2014 (EIA, 2015a . Due to data limitations related to delivered prices and transportation costs, we ignore coal exports, coke, comercial use, and coal used by industrial consumers. 9 The level of analysis in this report is at the state-year level for the nine states with reported federal coal royalty collections over the fiscal years 2008 to 2014. While our analysis includes important coal producing states like Wyoming, Kentucky, and Montana, other important states like West Virginia, Illinois, and Pennsylvania are excluded due to the lack of mining on federal leases in those states. While these excluded states will presumably be affected by the policy changes we consider, we expect these effects to be minimal compared to the nine states with federal royalty collections. 10 Five types of information are used in the analysis. State-year data regarding federal royalty collections are reported by the ONRR. Data on market prices, transportation costs and quantities delivered to the domestic power sector are from SNL Financial. Severance tax and corporate income tax rates are gathered from various state sources. Finally, price elasticities of supply and demand are determined using publicly available information from Hodge (2012) and the EIA (2015b). The own price elasticities we use are determined from estimates allowing for interfuel substitution between coal and natural gas.
The ONRR (2015) reports state-year production on federal leases, the corresponding sales value, and federal royalty collections. Using this information, we determine the average price used for royalty valuation, and the average statutory royalty rate. The averages are determined as annual averages across the seven years in our sample and are reported in Table 1 . 11 The statutory royalty rate in Table 1 varies from a low of 2.3% in North Dakota to a high of 12.3% in Wyoming. In general, royalty rates are set at 12.5% for coal extracted from surface mines and 8% for coal from underground mines. The statutory rates we find are lower due to royalty rate reductions granted by the BLM to address economic conditions and promote full recovery of leased federal coal.
It is important to note that the information reported by the ONRR includes all coal extracted from federal leases. This includes coal exports and coal used outside of the electric power sector.
Currently the ONRR does not provide sufficient information to separately identify coal royalty payments from coal used in different sectors. Since our analysis focuses on coal used for electricity generation, the average prices we determine using the ONRR data are biased. Table 2 lists the average prices of coal stratified by the end use of coal. Since the average prices of coal used for electricity generation are lower than other uses, we overestimate the average price of coal used for royalty valuation, resulting in an underestimate of the difference between the mine price and net delivered prices -a measure of the extent that non-arm's length transactions occur.
Information on all monthly coal deliveries to the electric power sector between October, 2007 and September, 2014 (fiscal years 2008 -2014 were obtained from SNL Financial. These data include identifiers for the mine (MSHA ID) 12 and plant, tons delivered, delivered cost per ton, estimated transportation costs, and original transportation mode (barge, mine mouth, railroad, or truck).
Out of the 144,205 records obtained, 19,261 records (13.4%) contain missing information and are removed from the dataset.
For each state-year, we determine the total quantity extracted, the production weighted price, and the production weighted transportation cost. State-year quantities are determined from all mine deliveries, and the average prices and transportation costs are determined from mine deliveries from mines that have active federal leases. 13 Average annual quantities, prices and transportation 11 Table 25 in the appendix presents the state-year statutory royalty rates. 12 The MSHA ID is a mine identifier assigned by the US Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration.
13 Mines with active federal leases are matched by their MSHA ID to a list provided by the BLM obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request.
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costs and are reported in Table 3 . Wyoming and Kentucky are the highest producing states in our sample. The share of coal extracted on federal land, α, is low in Kentucky, making Wyoming, Colorado and Montana the three states with the highest levels of production subject to federal royalty payments. Alabama and Kentucky are the states with the highest average transportation costs, but transportation costs as a ratio of the average price is highest in Wyoming and Montana.
This distinction is important as all else equal, a marginal change in γ will have a larger impact in Alabama and Kentucky, and a marginal change in β will have a larger impact in Wyoming and Montana.
In addition to state-year observations, we divide each state-year into H, M and L subgroups based on the ratio of transportation costs to the net price. These subgroups describe state-year observations with high, medium or low transportation costs relative to the net price. Each transaction within a state-year group with T /p ≥ 1 is placed into the H group. Transactions with 1 > T /p ≥ 0.5 are in the M group, and the remaining transactions are in the L group. These subgroups add precision when determining the effects associated with a marginal decrease in β. 14 Also included in Table 3 are the average annual values of α (the quantity of coal extracted from federal leases as a share of the total quantity of coal extracted) by state. 15 State-year values of α are determined by dividing the state-year quantity of federal coal reported by the ONRR, by the total state-year quantity reported by the MSHA (2015) . Both the numerator and denominator used to determine α include all coal extracted, including exports and other industrial uses: an unconditional value of α. We assume that the share of production from federal leases, conditional on the coal being used in the electric power sector, is equal to the unconditional value of α. Ideally we would have values of α determined just from coal used in the electric power sector, but this data is not available. 16 Both Table 1 and Table 3 include net prices for coal used in the electric power sector. The prices in Table 3 are based on deliveries to utilities and the prices in Table 1 are based on information reported to ONRR for federal royalty collections. As already indicated, the prices in Table 1 are 14 State-year observations of the quantities, prices and transportation costs for each subgroup are reported in Tables 26 and 27 of the appendix. Note that not all subgroups are represented as some states do not have mine level transactions included in a particular subgroup.
15 Table 28 includes state-year values of α. 16 The mine level transaction data does not sufficiently distinguish whether coal is extracted on a federal lease as some mines span land covered by a federal lease and land covered by a state/private lease.
biased upwards, and even with this bias, we find that in some states the average price based on deliveries is greater than the average price used for federal royalty collections. In other states we find the opposite, where the average price used when valuing coal for royalty collections is greater than the average price of coal based on deliveries. We attribute this difference to the upward bias in the average price determined using data from ONRR.
Effective royalty rates are calculated for each state where the average delivered price is greater than the average fob mine price currently used for royalty valuation. To determine the effective royalty rate, we first determine the value of federal coal by multiplying the state-year quantity of federal coal by the state-year average delivered price. The effective royalty rate is obtained by dividing the royalty collections by the value of federal coal based on delivered prices. The average annual effective royalty rates are listed in Table 4 . 17
Also included in Table 4 are the average annual statutory royalty rates and the difference between the effective and statutory rates. The difference between the two rates is the greatest in Montana and Wyoming indicating that these states have the largest difference between reported prices to the ONRR and delivered prices. Because the average prices determined from the ONRR data are biased upwards, the difference between the effective rate and the statutory rate is biased downwards. For New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah, we find no difference between the average effective and statutory rates. Since the differences in the rates are biased downwards, the use of non-arm's length transactions may still be prevalent in these states, but we are not able to observe a difference in prices given the current data.
State specific policy variables, including state severance tax rates and corporate income tax rates, are presented in The price elasticity of demand for coal is determined from the demand for electricity generation. Ko and Dahl (2001) survey existing studies and report that the price elasticity of demand for coal 17 The state-year effective rates are presented in Table 24 of the appendix. 18 See Haggerty (2015) for more information about how these rates were obtained. 19 The federal rate is 20% and to determine the combined rate, see Footnote 7.
is inelastic with an average price elasticity of demand for coal reported across the different studies of −0.46. Both Ko and Dahl (2001) and Dahl and Ko (1998) examine interfuel substitution for US electricity generation, and estimate both cross fuel price elasticities of demand and own fuel price elasticities using monthly data. Ko and Dahl (2001) find the price elasticity of demand for coal is −0.57 and Dahl and Ko (1998) find a price elasticity of demand of −0.16 using a translog model and −0.26 using a logit model.
The most recent estimates of the price elasticity of demand for coal are determined by Hodge (2012) and are reported in Table 6 . Price elasticities are determined using monthly data from 2005-2010, and these estimates are reported at the NERC region. 20 While our level of analysis is at the state level, Bernstein and Griffin (2006) find that NERC regions appropriately capture regional differences in demand that occur at the state level. Coal extracted from one state gets transported to multiple NERC regions, and for each state considered, we determine state-NERC region shares.
The price elasticity of demand for coal at the state level is determined as the share weighted NERC region average, and these estimates are reported in Table 7 . 21 Information regarding the price elasticity of supply for coal is limited due to the proprietary nature of this data. A survey by Dahl and Duggan (1996) indicates that the median price elasticity of supply for coal measured by previous studies is 0.79 with values ranging from 0.05 to 7.9. Unlike the price elasticity of demand, the price elasticity of supply for coal is not available 20 NERC is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation and is divided into eight different regional entities: the Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC), the Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO), the Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC), the ReliabilityFirst Corporation (RFC), the SERC Reliability Corporation (SERC), the Southwest Power Pool, RE (SPP), the Texas Reliability Entity (TRE), and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC).
21 State-group-year estimates are presented in Table 29 of the appendix. at the NERC region level; the US level estimate is used as a state level estimate. Overall, one would expect that the price elasticity of supply of coal for underground mines to be relatively more inelastic compared to surface mines. Estimates for surface mines should also vary across states/regions.
Analysis
We determine the average annual impact proposed policy changes have on prices, quantities and revenue/tax collections. In addition to point estimates of the expected annual impact, we also estimate the standard errors associated with the policy changes. 23 To establish a baseline for revenue and tax collections, Table 8 presents the expected revenues determined from equations (2), (3), and (4). All the revenue measures reported in Table 8 are determined using the net prices and transportation costs listed in Table 26 and the quantities from Table 27 . Royalty revenues are determined using the effective royalty rates (Table 24) , and tax collections utilize the state policy variables listed in Table 5 . An estimate of the average cost, c, is required to estimate baseline corporate income tax revenues. Since we lack sufficient information regarding firm costs, throughout our analysis we use a value of c that is 80% of the price.
Baseline royalty revenues are expected to closely match actual royalty collections since the effective royalty rates are determined from the ONRR's information on royalty collections. Total royalty revenues average $654 million per year with $560 million per year being generated in Wyoming.
Colorado, Montana, and Utah are the other states with larger annual royalty collections with $36, $25, and $22 million respectively.
Unlike royalty revenues, we do not expect our baseline severance tax and income tax collections to match actual collections-except for Oklahoma which has no severance tax. Tax collections are based on statutory rates rather than effective rates. The statutory rates reported in Table 5 are used, as we lack sufficient information on actual tax collections to determine effective tax rates. If a state grants a reduction in their severance tax rate or if some part of corporate income taxes are deductible, then the effective rates will be lower than the statutory rates resulting in an overestimate of tax collections.
An additional bias is introduced to baseline tax collections as we use net prices from coal deliveries to determine collections. If the prices reported to the ONRR are used when determining taxes, particularly severance taxes, then actual tax collections will be lower. This bias also results in an overestimate of tax collections and our baseline estimates of severance and income tax collections are overstated. Below we discuss how these biases affect our predictions of the change in tax collections and the corresponding percentage changes.
Changes in the Royalty Rate
It is expected that an increase in the royalty rate from the effective rate to the statutory rate, results in an increase in the net price and a decrease in the quantity of coal extracted. The expected changes in prices are reported in Table 9 . We exclude New Mexico, Oklahoma and Utah as we do not observe a difference between the effective and statutory royalty rate. 24 On average, we expect coal prices to increase by 23 cents which represents a 0.89% increase in the price of coal.
The price effects are heterogeneous across states with the largest expected increase occurring in Montana: 42 cents or 1.92%. The third column of Table 9 lists the standard error associated with the expected price change. The fourth and fifth columns of Table 9 present 90% confidence intervals associated with the price change. We truncate these confidence intervals by the theoretical limits associated with the price change described in Lemma 2.2. Overall, we find that there is a 90% chance that the price of coal will increase any where between 25 and 19 cents per ton when net delivered prices are used for the valuation of coal.
The expected changes in quantities are presented in Table 10 . Overall, it is expected that the quantity of coal extracted decreases by 970 thousand short tons per year: a decrease of 0.17%. The largest effect on a tonnage basis occurs in Wyoming (-900 thousand tons), but on a percentage basis the largest decrease occurs in Montana (-0.26%). Table 11 lists the expected changes in royalty revenues and tax collections. Total royalty revenues are expected to increase by $141 million per year, a 22% increase. The combined expected decrease in severance and income taxes is $4 million per year, a decrease of 0.16% and 0.81%. While not reported in Table 11 , the 90% confidence interval associated with the change in royalty revenues is an annual increase in revenue between $106 million per year and $176 million per year. Of the $141 million per year increase in royalty revenues, $128 million per year occurs from production in Wyoming and $11 million per year occurs from production in Montana. On a percentage basis, these states also have large percentage increases.
As stated above, our estimates of the baseline severance and income tax collections are biased upwards because we use statutory tax rates that do not include any deductions. These statutory tax rates are also used to determine the change in tax collections and result in an overstatement of the change in tax collections reported in Table 11 . On a percentage basis, since the same bias is included in baseline tax collections and the changes, we expect the percentage change in tax collections we find to be more reflective of the actual expected percentage changes. 25
Changes in β
Currently transportation costs are fully deductible and royalty revenues are based on the net prices of coal. One proposal considered is to include transportation costs that exceed a proportion of the price into the valuation of coal for royalty payments. In Section 2 we modeled this proposal as a decrease in β, and here we consider two changes in β. The first change is to reduce β to 1 so that royalty payments on transportation costs only occur if transportation costs exceed 100% of the price. The second change is to reduce β even lower to 0.5.
A change in β includes threshold effects, and to properly estimate the changes due to a decrease in β we determine a cutoff value of β, where β c = T /p for each state-group-year. If β > β c , then T = 0 and a marginal decrease in β has no effect. If β c > β, then a marginal decrease in β does have an effect on the market. For a decrease in β to 1, if the value of β c < 1 for a state-group-year, then the decrease in β has no effect on that state-group-year. Instead if β c > 1, then we consider a change in β from β c to 1. For this change from β c to 1,T = 0, ∂T ∂p = −β c , and Table 12 presents the changes in prices due to a decrease in β from β c to 1. Only four states are listed in this table because the decrease in β to 1 only affects type H state-year-groups and not all states have a type H group. With β = 1, the price of coal is expected to increase by 18 cents per ton with the only significant changes occurring in Wyoming (24 cents per ton) and Montana (5 cents per ton). The expected changes in quantities are presented in Table 13 , and at most we expect a 0.2% reduction in the quantity of coal extracted. The expected changes in revenues are included in Table 14 . Total tax collections decrease by $2 million per year, but total royalty revenues increase by $100 million per year. Almost all of the increase in royalty revenue comes from Wyoming. The 90% confidence intervals associated with the total increase in royalty revenues range from $65 million per year to $138 million per year. Now consider a much larger decrease in β from β c to 0.5. This change affects both H and M groups and thus affects more states. Table 15 lists the expected changes in prices when β is decreased to 0.5. The expected change in coal prices across all states is an increase of 55 cents per ton, a 2.1% increase. The largest expected increases occur in Wyoming, with an increase of 75 cents per ton (4.87%), and in Montana, with an increase of 19 cents per ton (0.86%). The expected changes in the quantity of coal extracted are presented in Table 16 . Overall, the expected change in extraction is a decrease in over 2.3 million tons per year, a 0.42% decrease. Almost all of the quantity change occurs in Wyoming where extraction is expected to decrease by 0.57% per year. Table 17 includes the changes in revenues and collections. A decrease in β to 0.5 is expected to increase royalty revenues by 49% ($320 million per year) with a 90% chance the increase in royalty revenues is between $267 and $374 million per year. The expected decrease in tax collections totals $8 million per year, less than a 2% decrease in severance taxes and income taxes. An overwhelming majority of the increase in royalty revenues and decreases in tax collections occurs in Wyoming.
Combining the Policy Changes
Thus far, we have considered an increase in τ r and a decrease in β separately. We now evaluate what would happen if τ r was increased from the effective rate to the statutory rate while β is decreased from β c to 0.5. To evaluate the combined change, we first evaluate the increase in τ r and then evaluate the decrease in β, taking into account that the increase in τ r changes prices, quantities and β c . The combined change differs from a simple sum of each individual change. Table 18 describes the expected changes in price and quantities for the combined change. Oklahoma is not included as this is the only state not affected by the changes in τ r and in β. The greatest expected changes occur in Wyoming where the expected increase in price is $1.18 per ton (7.68%) and the expected decrease in quantity is 3.5 million tons per year (-0.88%). Average prices in the US are expected to increase by $0.88 per ton (3.36%) and the expected decrease in quantity is 3.7 million tons per year (-0.65%). Table 19 Table 19 are likely non-marginal and thus are missing changes on any extensive margins. In Section 4.5 we discuss the types of changes that might occur on the extensive margin and the likelihood of these changes.
An Increase in γ
In Section 4.2 we considered a decrease in β from β c to 0.5. One potential issue with changes in the deductibility of transportation costs modeled as a decrease in β, is that these changes contain threshold effects. Only coal deliveries with high transportation costs are affected and deliveries with lower transportation costs are not affected at all. Instead of decreasing β, an alternative policy is to increase γ and include all transportation costs in royalty payments on a proportional basis.
Here we consider an increase in γ from 0 to 0.4799 as this change is expected to generate the same increase in royalty revenue as a decrease in β to 0.5. The expected changes in revenues from an increase in γ are reported in Table 22 . The total annual increase in royalty revenue is expected to be $320 million per year which is the same increase reported in Table 17 for a decrease in β to 0.5. The results in Tables 22 and 17 
Substitution and Heterogeneity in Coal Markets
Policy reform that increases the cost of coal from federal leases may cause substitution from federal leases to state and private coal leases. Substitution across coal basins could occur if, for example, domestic utilities/generating facilities switch from PRB coal, which is largely extracted from federal leases, to coal from the Illinois Basin where no federal leases exist. Substitution might also occur within a coal basin or state if production can be shifted from mines on federal leases to mines on state/private leases in close proximity.
In our model, these types of substitution would result in a decrease in α, and currently we assume that α is fixed, meaning that substitution between and within states and basins does not occur with the proposed policies. If these types of substitution do occur, then the increase in federal royalty revenues and reduction in state tax collections are likely overstated. Even though our model does not capture these two different types of substitution, our model is well suited to evaluate how the changes in policy considered affect the PRB states of Montana and Wyoming.
We expect our results for non-PRB states to be less accurate, since across state and within state substitution is more likely in these states. Even though we are able to less accurately identify the changes in non-PRB states, our overall results still remain valid as our results are driven by changes primarily in Wyoming and Montana.
First, within state substitution of coal extracted from federal leases to coal extracted from state or private leases is less likely to occur in states with higher average values of α. The higher the value of α, the more extraction within the state that occurs on federal leases. Since relatively more productive assets are focused on extracting coal from federal leases, it is relatively more difficult to reduce α through changes in the intensive margin, and, at least in the short-run, difficult to change the extensive margins. 26
Where federal ownership dominates, states tend to adopt federal rules and royalty policies on state land. This is true in Colorado, Montana, and Wyoming, and likely in other Western states as well. If federal policy changes, we expect states would adapt their policy to match. If state land policies are reactive to federal policy, in-state switching becomes even less likely as any returns from shifting production to state land are reduced.
The state-level average values of α are reported in Table 3 . Since α is high for Wyoming (0.9), we do not expect that there will be a substantial shift from extraction on federal land within the state and within the PRB to extraction on state/private land. Other states with a higher average value of α are Colorado (0.7), Montana (0.6), Utah (0.6), and Oklahoma (0.6). The remaining states in our sample have a much lower average value of α and coal producing states not included in our sample have a value of α = 0.
Second, substitution across states and basins is unlikely to happen due to inherent differences in the qualities of coal, making coal from different basins imperfect substitutions. For example, coal from the PRB is characterized by a low energy content and low sulfur content compared to coal from other basins. Substituting PRB coal for other types of coal involves substantial switching costs for a coal fired power plant due to asset specificity. The transportation of coal from a mine to a plant is highly specialized and is typically served by one rail line. Plants are also engineered to maximize efficiency conditional on the type of coal used, so switching from PRB coal to Illinois Basin coal would involve substantial conversion costs. 27
The data used in our analysis indicates that coal fired power plants exhibit a high degree of lock-in to a particular coal basin. 28 Expanding our data to include all coal mines and plants from 26 Given the large fixed costs associated with coal mining, it is likely that the short-run time horizon is much longer than in other industries.
27 Joskow (1987) mentions both transportation and conversion costs as two examples of asset specificity in electricity generation.
28 The lock-in associated with mine/plant relationships is also discussed by Joskow (1985) and Joskow (1987) to all states (not just states with federal leases), we mapped coal deliveries to each plant in 2014 by the coal basin of origin. We find that 65% of all plants sourced 100% of their coal from one coal basin. In addition, 80% of all plants sourced 80% of their total deliveries from a single coal basin.
One potential reason for a coal fired power plant to be locked in to a particular coal basin is due to asset specificity with respect to maximizing boiler efficiency. If this is the case, the variation in the energy content of coal delivered to a plant should be low. Column 2 in Table 23 lists the mean energy content, measured in Btu/lbs, for coal deliveries to each NERC region. Note that NERC regions in the eastern US (FRCC, NPCC, RFC, and SERC) source relatively less of their coal from the PRB which explains why the coal used in these regions has a higher average energy content. Table 23 also contains the coefficients of variation in the energy content associated with coal deliveries. The third column is the NERC region average coefficient of variation and the fourth column is the average coefficient of variation for each plant within that NERC region. Note that the variation in energy content at the plant level is much lower than the variation at the region level indicating a high degree of asset specificity at the plant level.
Conclusion
Our results suggest that changes to federal royalty policy would have a small effect on coal production and delivered prices, but a large revenue benefit to the federal government. These findings are consistent with previous studies on royalties and severance taxes which indicated that royalties and severance taxes are an efficient way to raise revenue. We find that if the ONRR valued coal based on delivered prices net of transportation costs, average total royalty revenues would increase by $141 million per year. The affects of this change on prices and quantities are minimal as we find that the average increase in the delivered price is 23 cents per ton (0.89%) and the decrease in the quantity of coal extracted is 971 thousand tons per year (-0.17%). Severance and income tax collections are expected to decrease by $4 million per year, easily offset by the increase in royalty revenues.
In addition to basing the value of coal on delivered prices, if transportation costs that exceed 50 percent of the value of coal are included in royalty payments, we find that royalty revenues are explain why long-term contracts are prevalent in this industry.
expected to increase by $517 million per year. This change would increase the average delivered price of coal by 88 cents per ton (3.36%), decrease the quantity extracted by 3.7 million tons per year (-0.65%), and reduce severance and income tax collections by $13 million per year. Instead of collecting royalties on transportation costs that exceed a percentage of the delivered price, we find similar effects for collecting royalties on a proportion of transportation costs.
We find evidence of heterogenous impacts across states, with a much larger impact for the PRB states of Wyoming and Montana where more coal is extracted from federal leases and transportation costs are greater. When coal royalties are based on delivered prices, total royalty revenues increase by $141 million per year with $139 million resulting from changes in Wyoming and Montana. This represents a 23% increase in royalty revenues from Wyoming and a 45% increase in royalty revenues from Montana.
Our analysis is based at the state-year level and ignores any heterogeneity in coal based on differences in heat and sulfur content. While coal is heterogeneous across coal basins, it is more homogeneous within a basin. Since states usually contain only one coal basin, by focusing our analysis at the state-year level we are able to abstract from differences in the quality of coal. This also allows us to generate overall price/quantity/revenue differences for each state based on the average quality of coal within a state.
As with any study, there are always caveats to the results. The available data from the ONRR describing the federal royalty program lack precision making this assessment difficult. The inferred price for each state is inclusive of deliveries to all markets, including industrial consumers, coke plants, and exports. Since our analysis focuses on the electric power sector, we underestimate the differences between delivered prices and the prices used for royalty valuation. Our underestimate of the price difference results in a downward bias in our estimates of the change in prices, quantities and royalty revenues and is one reason we present confidence intervals for these changes. We also lack precision when determining the expected changes in severance and corporate income taxes, and our results overstate the expected decrease in tax collections.
Another issue is that our estimates are based on the analysis of a static model and does not capture relevant dynamic changes in coal markets resulting from the proposed policy reforms. Due to this limitation, our results are robust only for states where a large share of coal is extracted from federal leases and the extracted coal is an imperfect substitute for coal from other states. This is 27 true for the PRB states of Wyoming and Montana, and we expect our results to be more robust for these states and less robust for other states. Since changes in Wyoming and Montana form the lion's share of our results, our overall analysis is valid.
It is also important to note that our analysis is retrospective as we estimate average annual changes from 2008-2014. With the substantial changes being experienced in coal markets, it would be difficult to use past data to make future, out of sample, predictions. Nevertheless, we would expect the proposed reforms we evaluate to result in a substantial increase in royalty revenue with a minimal effect on coal production and delivered prices, and our analysis highlights the importance of reforming the assessment of federal coal royalties.
A Determination of Expected Values and the Variance
In our analysis, we treat p, Q, T , α,τ r , and η as random numbers. Let A be a vector of state-year observations where A includes p, Q, T , α, and τ r . A statistic of interest is Z = f (A, , η) where Z may be the change in price, the change in quantity, a change in royalty revenues, or a change in tax collections. If Z is the state-year change in price, we determine Z as the transaction weighted price across the H, M and L groups. Otherwise Z is the sum across the different groups within a state-year.
Here we derive E[Z] and V ar(Z) and our derivation excludes subscripts for state-years for simplicity of exposition. Annual variation in A is used to determine the annual expected values and the variance associated with those expected values. The expected values and variances are complicated since we only have point estimates for the expected values and variances of and η. We assume independence between A, and η because we lack information on the covariances between A, and η. In general, these different sets of variables are not expected to be statistically independent.
The expected value of Z is determined using the law of iterated expectations where 
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The derivative of f (·) with respect to a change in either or η is determined from the relevant equation listed in Section 2. We determine V ar(f (A, , η)|A) for each state-year observation and
is determined by taking the sample average of V ar(f (A, , η)|A) over the different years. 
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